Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids by Leonardi, Stefano et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
61
2.
03
15
0v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  9
 D
ec
 20
16
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
Stefano Leonardi1, Gianpiero Monaco2, Piotr Sankowski3, and Qiang Zhang1
1 Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, leonardi@dis.uniroma1.it, qzhang@gmail.com
2 University of L’Aquila, Italy, gianpiero.monaco@univaq.it
3 University of Warsaw, Poland, sank@mimuw.edu.pl
Abstract. Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study budget feasible mecha-
nisms where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we are given a
matroidM = (E, I) where each ground (indivisible) element is a selfish agent. The cost of each element
(i.e., for selling the item or performing a service) is only known to the element itself. There is a buyer
with a budget having additive valuations over the set of elements E. The goal is to design an incentive
compatible (truthful) budget feasible mechanism which procures an independent set of the matroid
under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to the buyer. Our result is a deterministic,
polynomial-time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with 4-approximation
to the optimal independent set. Then, we extend our mechanism to the setting of matroid intersections
in which the goal is to procure common independent sets from multiple matroids. We show that, given
a polynomial time deterministic blackbox that returns α−approximation solutions to the matroid in-
tersection problem, there exists a deterministic, polynomial time, individually rational, truthful and
budget feasible mechanism with (3α+ 1)−approximation to the optimal common independent set.
1 Introduction
Procurement auctions (a.k.a. reverse auctions), often carried out by governments or private com-
panies, deal with the scenarios where a buyer would like to purchase objects from a set of sellers.
These objects are not limited to physical items. For instance they can be services provided by
sellers. In this work we consider the problem where a buyer with a budget is interested in a set
of indivisible objects for which he has additive valuations. We assume that each object is a selfish
agent. More specifically, we assume agents have quasi-linear utilities and they are rational (i.e.,
they aim to maximize the differences between the payments they receive and their true costs).
We also restrict ourself to the case where the buyer is constrained to purchase a subset of objects
that forms an independent set with respect to an underlying matroid structure. A wide variety of
research studies have shown that matroids are linked to many interesting applications, for example,
auctions [2,9,13], spectrum market [17], scheduling matroids [8] and house market [14].
One challenge in such procurement auctions involves providing incentives to sellers for declaring
their true costs when those costs are their private information. A classical mechanism, namely
Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism [7,11,18], provides an intuitive solution to this problem.
The VCG mechanism returns a procurement that maximizes the valuation of the buyer and the
payments for sellers are their externalities to the procurement. The VCG mechanism is a truthful
mechanism, i.e., no seller will improve its utility by manipulating its cost regardless the costs
declared by others. However, the VCG mechanism also has its drawbacks. One of the drawbacks,
which makes VCG mechanism impractical, is that the payments to sellers could be very high. To
overcome this problem two different approaches have been proposed and investigated. The first
one is studying the frugality of mechanisms [12], which studies the minimum payment the buyer
needs to pay for a set of objects when sellers are rational utility maximizers. The other approach is
developing budget feasible mechanisms [16], where the goal is to maximize the buyer’s value for the
procurement under a given budget when sellers are rational utility maximizers. Singer [16] showed
that budget feasible mechanisms could approximate the optimal procurement that “magically”
knows the costs of sellers, when the buyer’s valuation is nondecreasing submodular.
Our Results. The goal of this study is to design budget feasible mechanisms for procuring objects
that form an independent set in a given matroid structure. To the best of our knowledge it is the first
time that matroid constraints are considered in the budget feasible mechanisms setting examined
here. Previous work was mainly devoted to different types of valuations for the buyer (see the
Related Work subsection). Our results are positive. In Section 3 we give a deterministic, polynomial
time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with 4-approximation to the
optimal independent set (i.e., the independent set with maximum value for the buyer under the given
budget) within the budget of the buyer when the buyer has additive valuations. To generalize this
result we also provide a similar mechanism to procure the intersection of independent sets in multiple
matroids. In particular, given a deterministic polynomial time α-approximation algorithm for the
matroid intersection problems as a blackbox, in Section 4 we present a deterministic, polynomial
time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism with (3α+1)-approximation to
the optimal independent set within the budget of the buyer when the buyer has additive valuations.
It is also good to know the limitations (e.g. lower bounds) of such budget feasible mechanisms. In
particular the lower bound to any deterministic mechanism of 1+
√
2 for additive valuations with one
buyer presented in [6] (it is worth noticing that such lower bound do not rely on any computational
or complexity assumption), suggests that our mechanisms are not far away from the optimal ones.
Finally, budget feasible mechanisms also received a lot of attention when the valuation functions
are submodular [16] and XOS [3]. In Section 6 we slightly improve the analysis of the mechanism
proposed in [3]. Specifically, we improve the approximation ratio of the mechanism from 768 to 436
by tuning the parameters in the mechanism.
Related Work. The study of budget feasible mechanisms was initiated in [16]. It essentially
focuses on the procurement auctions when sellers have private costs for their objects and a buyer
aims to maximize his valuation function on subsets of objects, conditioned on that the sum of
the payments given to sellers cannot exceed a given budget of the buyer. In particular Singer [16]
considered budget feasible mechanisms when the valuation function of the buyer is nondecreasing
submodular. For general nondecreasing submodular functions, Singer [16] gave a lower bound of 2 for
deterministic budget feasible mechanisms and a randomized budget feasible mechanism with 112-
approximation. When the valuation function of the buyer is additive, a special class of nondecreasing
submodular functions, Singer [16] gave a polynomial deterministic budget feasible mechanism with
6-approximation and a lower bound of 2 for any deterministic budget feasible mechanism. All
results were improved in [6], for example, a deterministic budget feasible mechanism with 2 +√
2-approximation and an improved lower bound of 1 +
√
2 for any deterministic budget feasible
mechanism for additive valuations were given. Furthermore, Bei et al. [3] gave a 768-approximation
mechanism for XOS valuations and extended their study to Bayesian settings. Chan and Chen [5]
studied budget feasible mechanisms in the settings in which each seller processes multiple copies
of the objects. They gave logarithmic mechanisms for concave additive valuations and sub-additive
valuations.
Budget feasible mechanisms are attractive to many communities due to their various applica-
tions. In crowdsourcing the goal is to assign skilled workers to tasks when workers have private costs.
By injecting some characteristics in crowdsourcing, budget feasible mechanisms have been further
developed and improved. For example, Goel et al. [10] developed budget feasible mechanisms that
achieve 2e−1
e−1 -approximation to the optimal social welfare by exploiting the assumption that one
worker has limited contribution to the social welfare. Furthermore Anari et al. [1] gave a budget
feasible mechanism that achieves a competitive ratio of 1 − 1/e ≈ 0.63 by using the assumption
that the cost of any worker is relatively small compared to the budget of the buyer.
2
Another work close to ours is [4], which studies the “dual” problem of maximizing the revenue
by selling the maximum independent set of a matroid. They proposed a truthful ascending auction
in which a seller is constrained to sell objects that forms a basis in a matroid.
2 Preliminaries
Matroids. A matroid M is a pair of (E,I) where E is a ground set of finite elements and I ⊆ 2E
consists of subsets of the ground set satisfying the following properties:
– Hereditary property: If I ∈ I, then J ∈ I for every J ⊂ I.
– Exchange property: For any pair of sets I, J ∈ I, if |I| < |J |, then there exists an element e ∈ J
such that I ∪ {e} ∈ I.
The sets in I are called independent sets. Given a matroid M = (E,I) and T ⊆ E is a
subset of E, the restriction of M to T , denoted by M|T , is the matroid in which the ground set
is T and the independent sets are the independent sets of M that are contained in T . That is,
M|T = (T,I(M|T )) where I(M|T ) = {I ⊆ T : I ∈ I}. Similarly, the deletion of M, denoted
by M \ T , is the matroid in which the ground set is E − T and the independent sets are the
independent sets of M that do not contain any element in T . That is, M\ T = (E − T,I(M\ T ))
where I(M\ T ) = {I ⊆ E − T : I ∈ I}.
Matroid Budget Feasible Mechanisms. In an instance of the matroid budget feasible mechanism
design problem, we are given a matroid M = (E,I) consisting of n ground elements, each of whom
is associated with a weight we ∈ R+. Each element e ∈ E is also associated with a private cost
ce ∈ R+, which is only known to the element itself. Our goal is to design a truthful mechanism
that gives incentives to elements for declaring their private costs truthfully and then selects an
independent set conditioned on that the total payment given to the elements does not exceed a
given budget b. Given an independent set I ∈ I, the value of the independent set is defined by
w(I) =
∑
e∈I w(e). We compare the value of the independent set selected by the mechanism against
the value of the maximum-value independent set in which the total true cost of elements does not
exceed the budget.
We usew = 〈w1, . . . , wn〉 to denote the weight of the ground elements and use d = 〈d1, . . . , dn〉 to
denote the costs declared by the ground elements. Let τ be the maximum-weight element (breaking
ties arbitrarily), that is, wτ = maxe∈E we. We assume that de ∈ R+ and de ≤ b for any e ∈ E
since elements with costs greater than b cannot be selected by any mechanism due to the budget
constraint. This also implies that no element could improve its utility by declaring di > b. Given a
subset of element T , we use w−T and d−T to denote the weight and cost vector excluding elements
in T . Similarly, we use wT and dT to denote the weight and cost vector only including elements in
T . For each element e ∈ E, bb(e) = de
we
is called the buck-per-bang rate for element e.4
A deterministic mechanism M = (f, p) consists of an allocation function f :M,w,d, b→ I ∈ I
and a payment function p : M,w,d, b → Rn+. Given the weights and declared costs of the ground
elements, the allocation function returns an independent set in the matroid and the payment
function indicates the payments for all elements. Let fM (M,w,d, b) and pM (M,w,d, b) be the
independent set and payments returned by M , respectively. If element e is in the independent
set obtained by M , then fMe (M,w,d, b) = 1. Otherwise, fMe (M,w,d, b) = 0. It is assumed that
pMe (M,w,d, b) = 0 if fMe (M,w,d, b) = 0. The utility of an element is the difference between the
payment received from the mechanism and its true cost. More specifically, the utility of element e
is given by uMe (M,w,d, b) = pMe (M,w,d, b) − fMe (M,w,d, b) · ce.
4 we
ce
is usually known as the bang-per-buck rate. To simplify the presentation, we call de
we
the buck-per-bang rate.
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Individual Rationality: A mechanismM is individually rational if pMe (M,w,d, b)−fMe (M,w,d, b)·
de ≥ 0 for any M, any w ∈ Rn+, any d ∈ Rn+, any b ∈ R+ and any element e ∈ E. That is, no
element in the selected independent set is paid less than the cost it declared.
Truthfulness: A mechanism M is truthful if it holds uMe (M,w,d−e, ce, b) ≥ uMe (M,w,d−e, de, b)
for any M, any w ∈ Rn+, any d−e ∈ Rn−1+ , any de ∈ R+, any ce ∈ R+, b ∈ R+ and any e ∈ E,
where d−e = 〈d1, . . . , de−1, de+1, . . . , dn〉. When the context is clear, we sometimes abuse some
notations. For example, here we write uMe (M,w,d−e, ce, b) instead of uMe (M,w, 〈d−e, ce〉, b). A
truthful mechanism prevents any element improving its utility by mis-declaring its cost regardless
the costs declared by other elements.
Budget Feasibility: A mechanism M is budget feasible if it holds that
∑
e∈E p
M
e (M,w,d, b) ≤ b for
any M,w ∈ Rn+, any d ∈ Rn+ and any b ∈ R+.
Competitiveness: A mechanism M is α-competitive if w(fM (M,w,d, b)) ≥ 1
α
w(OPT(M,w,d, b))
for any w ∈ Rn+,d ∈ Rn+ and b ∈ R+, where OPT(M,w,d, b) is the maximum-value independent
set in which the total cost of the elements is at most b. We often call OPT(M,w,d, b) the optimal
independent set and simplify it as OPT(M, b) throughout the paper when the weights and the
costs of elements are clear. Similarly we use MAX(M,w), shorten by MAX(M), to denote the
maximum-value independent set in M without considering the budget constraint.
Simplifying notations. From now on to avoid heavy notations we sometimes simplify the notations.
For example we will write fM , fMe , p
M , pMe when the inputs of the mechanism are clear. And we
will use OPT(M \ T, b) instead of OPT(M \ T,w−T ,d−T , b) to denote the optimal independent
set in matroid M \ T . Similarly we will use OPT(M|T, b) instead of OPT(M|T,wT ,dT , b) to
denote the optimal independent set in matroid M |T . Furthermore we use MAX(M\ T ) instead of
MAX(M \ T,w−T ) to denote the maximum-value independent set in M\ T without considering
the costs of the elements and the budget.
3 Mechanisms for Matroids
In this section we provide our main result. We give a deterministic, polynomial time, individually
rational, truthful and budget feasible mechanism that is 4-approximating the optimal independent
set. Before providing the mechanism we discuss some intuition that guides us in the design of Mech-
anism 1. First imagine that there exists an element with a very high weight, i.e., any independent
set without this element results in a poor value compared to the optimal independent set. In this
case that element may strategically declare a high cost in order to increase its utility as it knows
that any competitive mechanism has to select it. To avoid that this happens we remove element
τ (i.e., the element with the largest weight) from the matroid via matroid deletion operation, and
compare it with the independent set computed later by the mechanism. Second we observe that
most of the existing budget feasible mechanisms adopt proportional payment schemes, where ele-
ments (i.e., agents) are paid proportionally according to their contribution in the solution. In other
words in a proportional payment scheme there is an uniform price such that the payments for
elements in the solution are the products of their contribution and this price. In addition greedy
algorithms are commonly used in matroid systems. Combining these two observations our plan is
to start from a high price and compute the maximum-value independent set in the matroid at each
iteration. If there is enough budget to pay this independent set at the current price then we proceed
to the final step of the mechanism. Otherwise we reduce the price and remove an element from the
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matroid. The buck-per-bang rate of that element becomes an upper bound of the payment on each
contribution in the next iteration. The mechanism performs the procedure described above until
the payment of the maximum-value independent set is within budget b. As we will show next, if
the value of the optimal independent set does not come from a single element, we are able to retain
most of the value of the optimal independent set after removing those elements. Finally, we show
that returning the better solution between the maximum-value independent set found and element
τ approximates the value of the optimal independent set within a factor of 4.
Mechanism 1: A budget feasible mechanism for procuring independent sets in matroids
Input: M = (E, I),w,d, b
Output: f ,p
1 Sort elements in E − τ in a non-increasing order of buck per bang, i.e. bb(i) ≥ bb(j) if i < j, break ties
arbitrarily;
2 Let bb(0) = +∞, i = 1 and T = ∅;
3 Set r = bb(i);
4 while w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ ))) · r > b do
5 T = T ∪ {i} and i = i+ 1;
6 r = min{ b
w(MAX(M\(T∪τ)))
, bb(i− 1)};
7 if w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ ))) > wτ then
8 For each e ∈ E, if e ∈ MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ )), fe = 1 and pe = r · we. Otherwise, fe = 0 and pe = 0;
9 else
10 fτ = 1, pτ = b. For edge e ∈ E − τ, fe = 0, pe = 0;
11 return f ,p;
Theorem 3.1. Mechanism 1 is a deterministic, polynomial time, individually rational, truthful
and budget feasible mechanism that is 4-competitive against the optimal independent set given a
budget.
3.1 Approximation
Recall that T is the set of elements removed from the matroid.MAX(M\(T ∪τ)) is the independent
set found when Mechanism 1 stops, and it is also the maximal-value independent set in matroid
M \ (T ∪ τ). The roadmap of the proof is to first show that, the independent set MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))
well approximates the optimal independent set in matroid M \ τ . Next we show that returning the
maximum between τ and MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) gives 4-approximation to the optimal independent set
in matroid M.
Lemma 3.1. Given any M,w,d, b, when Mechanism 1 stops, it holds
w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) ≤ 2w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) + wτ
Proof. It is trivial to see that this lemma holds when τ is the only element in matroid M. The rest
of the proof uses a similar idea in [10] and is divided into two cases depending on whether the full
budget b is spent or not. Consider E − {τ} is partitioned into two disjoint sets, E − {τ} − T and
T . The value of maximum-value independent set w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) is bounded by
w(OPT(M|T, b)) + w(OPT(M\ (T ∪ τ), b))
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As the buck-per-bang is at least r for every element in T , the optimal independent set given a budget
b in M|T , i.e. w(OPT(M|T, b)), is at most b/r. When the full budget is spent, the independent
set fM is b/r in Mechanism 1. On the other hand, fM is the maximum-value independent set in
M\ (T ∪ τ). It implies that w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) ≥ w(OPT(M\ (T ∪ τ), b)). The above analysis
concludes that
w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) ≤ 2w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)))
Now we turn to the case that some budget is left in Mechanism 1. Note that it happens because
r = bb(i− 1) (see Line 6) during the execution of Mechanism 1. Since Mechanism 1 does not stop
when r = bb(i − 1), it implies that the maximum-value independent set found was not budget
feasible at previous iteration. After removing element i − 1, the maximum-value independent set
becomes budget feasible when r = bb(i− 1). These together imply
w(MAX(M\ (T ′ ∪ τ))) · bb(i− 1) > b > w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) · bb(i− 1)
where T ′ = T − {i − 1}. This further implies that budget left is at most bb(i− 1) · wi−1. By the
similar argument as in previous case, the optimal independent set in M|T is at most b/r, while the
value of the independent set MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) is at least (b− bb(i− 1) ·wi−1)/r, which is at least
b/r − wi−1. Therefore, we have
w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) ≤ 2w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) + wi−1
Substituting wi−1 with wτ completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Next, we show that returning the maximum between τ and MAX(M\(T ∪τ)) is 4−competitive
against the optimal independent set in M.
Lemma 3.2. Given any M,w,d, b, the independent set returned by Mechanism 1, i.e., the maxi-
mum between τ or MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), is 4−competitive against the optimal independent set.
Proof. The optimal independent set in M is bounded by
w(OPT(M, b)) ≤ wτ + w(OPT(M\ τ, b))
By Lemma 3.1, we have
w(OPT(M, b)) ≤ 2wτ + 2w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)))
Therefore, the maximum between τ and MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) approximates the optimal independent
set within a factor of 4. ⊓⊔
3.2 Truthfulness
In this section, we will show that Mechanism 1 is truthful. It is easy to see that element τ cannot
benefit by manipulating its cost.
Lemma 3.3. The element with the maximum weight, i.e., element τ , could not improve his utility
by declaring cost dτ 6= cτ .
Proof. If Mechanism 1 returns element τ when τ declares his true cost, then τ gets a payment of b
so that there is no incentive for him to declare other cost. On the other hand, when Mechanism 1
returns MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), declaring a different cost will not change the outcome as it is still the
element with the largest weight and wτ < w(MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ))). ⊓⊔
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Next we show that no edge in E − τ could improve his utility by mis-declaring its cost. The
proof relies on the analysis of different cases. The first case shows that those removed element in
Mechanism 1 cannot benefit by manipulating their costs.
Lemma 3.4. Assume an element k in T when it declares its cost truthfully. Then, element k could
not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. As k ∈ T , we know that element k is not in the independent set returned by Mechanism 1.
Hence, his utility is zero. It implies, when element k is considered, that is, r = bb(k), it holds that
w(MAX(M\ (T k ∪ τ)))) · r > b where T k denotes the set of elements removed until k is considered.
Consider that element k declares a higher cost dk > ck and it is considered earlier at the h
th
iteration where h ≤ k. Equivalently speaking, k becomes the element with the hth largest buck-per-
bang rate. In this case, Mechanism 1 will not stop until k is considered. Note that the declared costs
are not involved in computing maximum-value independent sets. The maximum-value independent
sets computed are exactly the same as declaring truthfully until the hth iteration. Moreover, the
maximum-value independent set is also same in the hth iteration since the remaining elements in
the matroid are the same. As r in the hth is equal to or greater than before, the maximum-value
independent set is not budget feasible. It implies that element k will be removed from the matroid
and it will never be included in an independent set in Mechanism 1. Therefore, its utility is zero.
We use similar arguments to show that element k can not improve his utility by declaring a
smaller cost. Consider that element k declares a smaller cost dk < ck and it is considered at the
hth iteration where h ≥ k. Let us focus on how Mechanism 1 performs. Until the kth iteration,
maximum-value independent sets are the same as k declaring its cost truthfully and they are
not budget feasible. Next, the maximum-value independent set in kth is also the same as before.
If the independent set is budget feasible, then we know that b
w(MAX(M\(T∪τ))) is strictly less than
bb(k) = wk
ck
. It is because that the mechanism does not terminate at r = wk
ck
when element k declares
truthfully. Therefore, even element k is in this independent set, the payment will be strictly less
than his true cost. On the other hand, if the independent set is not budget feasible, then the
mechanism will update its upper bound of payment for each contribution in the next iteration. The
new upper bound is at most bb(k) = wk
ck
. It implies element k will never get a payment greater than
his true cost. ⊓⊔
In the second case we show that the remaining elements that are not included in the independent
set cannot benefit by manipulating their costs.
Lemma 3.5. Assume an element k is in E − τ − T −MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) when it declares its cost
truthfully. Then, element k could not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. As k /∈ MAX(M \ (T ∪ τ)), we know that the utility of element k is zero. Suppose that
the mechanism terminates at the hth round when element k declares its cost truthfully. Consider
that element k declares a higher cost dk > ck and it is consider at the l
th iteration where l < h.
In this case, Mechanism 1 will not stop before or at the lth iteration since the maximum-value
independent sets computed are exactly the same as k declaring its cost truthfully and they are not
budget feasible. It implies that element k will be removed from the matroid and it will never be
included in an independent set in Mechanism 1 by declaring a larger cost. Therefore, its utility is
still zero.
Secondly, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered at the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 1 will not stop before the hth iteration because the maximum-
value independent sets are not feasible. The maximum-value independent in the hth iteration is
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the same as k declaring its cost truthfully since the remaining elements are the same. Therefore, if
the independent set is budget feasible, the mechanism will compute the same independent set and
payments. Otherwise, element k will be removed as it must be the element with the hth largest
buck-per-bang rate. Element k cannot benefit in any case.
Finally, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered after the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 1 will compute the same independent set and payments. ⊓⊔
By similar arguments, we show that elements in the independent set cannot benefit by manip-
ulating their costs.
Lemma 3.6. Assume an element k is in MAX(M \ (T ∪ τ)) when it declares its cost truthfully.
Then, element k could not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as Lemma 3.5. Suppose that the mechanism terminates at
the hth round when element k declares its cost truthfully. As k ∈ MAX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), we know the
payment of element k is r · wk. Hence, his utility is r · wk − ck. Consider that element k declares
a higher cost dk > ck and it is considered at the l
th iteration where l < h. Similar to Lemma 3.5,
in this case Mechanism 1 will not stop before or at the lth iteration since the maximum-value
independent sets computed are exactly the same and they are not budget feasible. It implies that
element k will be removed from the matroid and it will never be included in an independent set in
Mechanism 1. Therefore, its utility becomes zero.
Secondly, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered at the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 1 will not stop before the hth iteration because the maximum-
value independent sets are not feasible. The maximum-value independent in the hth round is the
same as k declaring its cost truthfully since the remaining elements are the same. Therefore, if
the independent set is budget feasible, the mechanism will compute the same independent set and
payments. Otherwise, element k will be removed. Element k cannot benefit in any case.
Finally, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered after the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 1 will compute the same independent set and payments. ⊓⊔
3.3 Individual Rationality
When Mechanism 1 returns τ , the utility of τ is non-negative as cτ is at most b. The utilities for other
edges are zero. When Mechanism 1 returnsMAX(M\(T∪τ)), for any element e ∈ MAX(M\(T∪τ)),
that is, fe = 1, its utility is r ·we − ce which is non-negative since r ≥ bb(e). For other edges, their
utilities are zero.
3.4 Budget Feasibility
When Mechanism 1 returns τ , it only pays b to edge τ . Hence, it is budget feasible. On the other
hand, when Mechanism 1 returns MAX(M \ (T ∪ τ)), r is used as payment per contribution. As
r = min{ b
w(MAX(M\(T∪τ))) , bb(i− 1)}, it guarantees the budget feasibility.
3.5 Remarks
In Mechanism 1, we iteratively compute the maximum-value independent set (e.g. Line 4). In the
case that the maximum-value independent set is not unique, we assume there is a deterministic
tie-breaking rule. Note that all the results still hold under this assumption. For example, the
truthfulness of the mechanism will not be compromised since the the maximum-value independent
set only consider the weights of the elements that is the public knowledge.
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4 Mechanisms for matroid intersections
In this section we extend our mechanism to matroid intersections. The matroid intersection problem
(i.e., finding the maximum-value common independent set) is NP-hard in general when more than
three matroids are involved. Some interesting cases of matroid intersection problems can be solved
efficiently (i.e., they can be formulated as the intersection of two matroids), for example, matchings
in bipartite graphs, arborescences in directed graphs, spanning forests in undirected graphs, etc.
Nevertheless we point out that a very similar mechanism to the one presented in last section achieves
a 4 approximation for the case when, instead of a matroid, we are given an undirected weighted
(general) graph where the selfish agents are the edges of the graph and the buyer wants to procure
a matching under the given budget that yields the largest value possible to him.
For general matroid intersections, our main result is the following. Given a deterministic poly-
nomial time blackbox APX that achieves an α-approximation to k-matroid intersection problems,
we provide a polynomial time, individually rational, truthful and budget feasible deterministic
mechanism that is (3α+1)-competitive against the maximum-value common independent set. The
mechanism is similar to Mechanism 1 by changing MAX to APX. It is well-known that the VCG
payment rule does not preserve the property of truthfulness in the presence of approximated solu-
tions (i.e., non-optimal outcome). However unlike the VCG mechanism, we show that Mechanism 2
preserves its truthfulness when APX is used. We believe that this result will make our contribution
more practical.
Mechanism 2: A budget feasible mechanism for procuring independent sets in matroid in-
tersections
Input: M = (E, I),w,d, b
Output: f ,p
1 Sort elements in E − τ in a non-increasing order of buck per bang, i.e. bb(i) ≥ bb(j) if i < j, break ties
arbitrarily;
2 Let bb(0) = +∞, i = 1 and T = ∅;
3 Set r = bb(i);
4 while w(APX(M\ T )) · r > b do
5 T = T ∪ {i} and i = i+ 1;
6 r = min{ b
w(APX(M\T ))
, bb(i− 1)};
7 if w(APX(M\ T )) > wτ then
8 For each e ∈ E, if e ∈ APX(M\ T ), fe = 1 and pe = r · wk. Otherwise, fe = 0 and pe = 0;
9 else
10 fτ = 1, pτ = b. For edge e ∈ E − τ, fe = 0, pe = 0;
11 return f ,p;
4.1 Matroid intersections
Given k-matroidM1, . . . ,Mk, letM = (E,I) be the“true matroid” where E is the common ground
elements and I = ⋂j Ij is the “true independent sets”. Similar as the notations we used before,
let OPT(M\ T , b) and OPT(M|T , b) denote the optimal independent set satisfying the budget
constraint in matroid M \ T and M|T , respectively. Let APX(M\ T , b) be the maximum-value
independent set in matroid M\ T returned by the α-approximation algorithm.
9
4.2 Obtaining O(α) approximation
We show the following key lemma, which is similar to Lemma 3.1 and implies the approximation
of our mechanism for matroid intersections.
Lemma 4.1. Given any M,w,d, b, when Mechanism 2 stops, it holds
w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) ≤ 2 · α · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) + α · wτ
Proof. The proof has the same spirit as the proof of Lemma 3.1. We consider two cases depending
on whether the full budget b is spent or not. Consider E −{τ} is partitioned into two disjoint sets,
E − {τ} − T and T . Similar to Lemma 3.1, when the full budget is spent, we get
w(OPT(M\ τ, b)) ≤w(OPT(M|T, b)) + w(OPT(M\ (T ∪ τ), b))
≤ b
r
+ α · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)))
≤(α+ 1) · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)))
When there is some budget left in Mechanism 2, the analysis involves one more step compared to
Lemma 3.1 although the idea is still to bound the budget left. Since Mechanism 2 does not stop
when r = bb(i − 1), it implies that the independent set returned by APX was not budget feasible
at previous iteration. It further implies that the maximum-value independent set is not budget
feasible either if the payment per weight is r. After removing element i − 1, the independent set
returned by APX becomes budget feasible when r = bb(ei−1). These together imply
w(MAX(M\(T ′∪τ)))·bb(i−1) ≥ w(APX(M\(T ′∪τ)))·bb(i−1) > b > w(APX(M\(T∪τ)))·bb(i−1)
where T ′ = T − {i− 1}. As the sum of w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ))) and w(i− 1) is at least 1
α
fraction of
w(MAX(M\ (T ′ ∪ τ))), we get
(
w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) + wi−1
) · bb(i− 1) ≥ 1
α
· w(MAX(M\ (T ′ ∪ τ))) · bb(i− 1) > b
α
Hence, we get w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) + wi−1 > bα·bb(i−1) . Finally,
OPT(M\ τ, b) ≤w(OPT(M|T, b)) + w(OPT(M\ (T ∪ τ), b))
≤ b
bb(i− 1) + α · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)
≤2 · α · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ) + α · wi−1
Substituting wi−1 with wτ completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Now, we show the competitive ratio of Mechanism 2
Lemma 4.2. Given any M,w,d, b, the independent set returned by Mechanism 2, i.e., the maxi-
mum between τ or APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), is 4α−competitive against the optimal independent set.
Proof. The optimal independent set in M is bounded by
w(OPT(M, b)) ≤ wτ + w(OPT(M\ τ, b))
By Lemma 3.1, we have
w(OPT(M, b)) ≤ (α+ 1)wτ + 2 · α · w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)))
Therefore, the maximum between τ and APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) approximates the optimal independent
set within a factor of 3α + 1. ⊓⊔
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4.3 Preserving the truthfulness
In this section, we will show that replacingMAX by APX preserve the truthfulness of the mechanism
for matroid intersections. The reason behind is that the mechanism works in a greedy fashion and
at each iteration the cost declared by elements does not affect the independent set computed in
the mechanism. The property of the truthfulness replies on the greedy approach instead of the
optimality of the independent set. Informally speaking, if an element declares a cost rather than
its true cost, its utility will remain the same or it will get removed. The proofs are similar to the
proofs in Section 3.2.
Lemma 4.3. Assume an element k ∈ T when it declares its cost truthfully. Then, element k could
not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. As k ∈ T , we know that element k is not in the independent set returned by Mechanism 2.
Hence, his utility is zero. It implies, when element k is considered, that is, r = bb(k), we get
w(APX(M\ (T k ∪ τ)))) · r > b where T k denotes the set of elements removed until k is considered.
Consider that element k declares a higher cost dk > ck and it is considered earlier at the h
th
iteration where h ≤ k. Equivalently speaking, k becomes the element with the hth largest buck-
per-bang rate. In this case, Mechanism 2 will not stop until k is considered as the independent sets
computed in APX are the same as k declaring its cost truthfully. Moreover, the independent set is
also the same in the hth iteration as the remaining elements are the same. As r in the hth is equal
to or greater than before, the independent set is not budget feasible. It implies that element k will
be removed from the matroid. It concludes that element k will never be included in an independent
set in Mechanism 1. Therefore, its utility is still zero.
On the other hand, consider that element k declares a smaller cost dk < ck and it is considered
at the hth iteration where h ≥ k. Let us focus on how Mechanism 2 performs. Until the kth iteration,
the independent sets computed in APX are the same as k declaring its cost truthfully and they
are not budget feasible. Next, the independent set in the kth iteration is the same as before. If the
independent set is budget feasible, then we know that r is strictly less than bb(k) = wk
ck
. It is because
that the mechanism does not terminate at r = wk
ck
when element k declares truthfully. Therefore,
even element k is in this independent set, the payment will be strictly less than his true cost. On
the other hand, if the independent set is not budget feasible, the mechanism will update its upper
bound of payment. The new upper bound is at most bb(k) = wk
ck
. It implies element k will never
get a payment greater than his true cost. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.4. Assume an element k is in E − τ − T − APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)) when it declares its cost
truthfully. Then, element k could not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. As k /∈ APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), we know that the utility of element k is zero. Suppose that the
mechanism terminates at the hth round when element k declares its cost truthfully. Consider that
element k declares a higher cost dk > ck and it is consider at the l
th iteration where l < h. In this
case, Mechanism 2 will not stop before or at the lth iteration since the independent sets computed
in APX are exactly the same as k declaring its cost truthfully and they are not budget feasible.
It implies that element k will be removed from the matroid and it will never be included in an
independent set in Mechanism 2. Therefore, its utility is still zero.
Secondly, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered at the hth iteration.
In this case, Mechanism 2 will not stop before the hth iteration because the independent sets are
not feasible. The independent in the hth iteration is the same as k declaring its cost truthfully
since the remaining elements are the same. Therefore, if the independent set is budget feasible,
the mechanism will compute the same independent set and payments. Otherwise, element k will
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be removed as it must be the element with the hth largest buck-per-bang rate. Element k cannot
benefit in any case.
Finally, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered after the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 2 will compute the same independent set and payments. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.5. The element with the maximum weight, i.e., element τ , could not improve his utility
by declaring a cost dτ 6= cτ .
Proof. If Mechanism 2 returns element τ when τ declares his true cost, then τ gets a payment of b
so that there is no incentive for him to declare other cost. On the other hand, when Mechanism 2
returns APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), declaring a different cost will not change the outcome as it is still the
element with the largest weight and wτ < w(APX(M\ (T ∪ τ))). ⊓⊔
Lemma 4.6. Assume an element k is in APX(M \ (T ∪ τ)) when it declares its cost truthfully.
Then, element k could not improve his utility by declaring a cost dk 6= ck.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as Lemma 4.4. Suppose that the mechanism terminates at
the hth round when element k declares its cost truthfully. As k ∈ APX(M\ (T ∪ τ)), we know the
payment of element k is r · wk. Hence, his utility is r · wk − ck. Consider that element k declares
a higher cost dk > ck and it is considered at the l
th iteration where l < h. Similar to Lemma 4.4,
in this case Mechanism 2 will not stop before or at the lth iteration since the independent sets
computed in APX are exactly the same as k declaring its cost truthfully and they are not budget
feasible. It implies that element k will be removed from the matroid and it will never be included
in an independent set in Mechanism 2. Therefore, its utility becomes zero.
Secondly, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered at the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 2 will not stop before the hth iteration because the maximum-
value independent sets are not feasible. The independent in the hth round is the same as k declaring
its cost truthfully since the remaining elements are the same. Therefore, if the independent set is
budget feasible, the mechanism will compute the same independent set and payments. Otherwise,
element k will be removed. Element k cannot benefit in any case.
Finally, consider that element k declares a cost dk 6= ck and it is considered after the hth
iteration. In this case, Mechanism 2 will compute the same independent set and payments. ⊓⊔
5 Applications
In this section we briefly discuss some applications of our results.
Uniform Matroid Additive valuation has been studied in the design of budget feasible mecha-
nisms, e.g. [16,6]. In such settings a buyer would like to maximize his valuation by procuring items
under the constraint that his payment is at most his budget. Our result generalizes to the case
where the buyer has not only the budget constraint but also has a limit on the number of items he
can buy. For example hiring people in companies is not only constraint by budgets but also limited
by the office space.
Scheduling Matroid Our mechanism could be used to purchase processing time in the context
of job scheduling. One special case is the following. Each job is associated with a deadline and a
profit, and requires a unit of processing time. As jobs may conflict with each other, only one job
can be scheduled at the same time. The buyer would like to maximize his profit by completing jobs
under the constraint that he does not spend more than his budget in purchasing processing time.
Spectrum Market Tse and Hanly [17] showed that the set of achievable rates in a Gaussian
multiple-access, known as the Cover-Wyner capacity region, forms a polymotroid. It is known there
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is a pseudopolynomial reduction from polymatroids to matroids [15]. Therefore, our mechanism can
be used to purchase transmission rates by tele-communication companies.
6 XOS functions
Budget feasible mechanisms received a lot of attention also when the valuations functions are
submodular [16] and XOS [3]. In this study, we also slightly improve the analysis of the mechanism
proposed in [3]. Specifically, we improve the approximation of the mechanism from 768 to 436 by
tuning the parameters in the mechanism.
Theorem 6.1. There exists a randomized universally truthful mechanisms that provides a 436-
approximation ratio for XOS valuation functions.
6.1 Model
We are given a set E consisting of n elements and a budget b. Each element e ∈ E has a private
cost ce. For any subset S ⊆ E, there is publicly known valuation function v(S) that indicates the
value of S. In this section, we are interested in XOS valuation functions. More precisely, a function
v(·) is XOS if
v(S) = max{f1(S), f2(S), . . . , fm(S)} for any S ⊆ E
where each fk(·) is a nonnegative additive function.
Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that give elements incentives to declare their true
private costs. Meanwhile, mechanisms aim to choose a set of elements within the budget and
maximize the value of the chosen agents. Unlike matroids, the mechanism is allowed to select
any subset of elements. We compare our mechanisms against the optimal mechanism which alway
magically knows the private costs of elements. The optimal mechanism returns a set of elements
such that the aggregated cost of elements is at most budget b and the value of the elements is
maximized. We compare the value of elements chosen by our mechanisms against the value of
elements returned by the optimal mechanism.
Similar as truthful mechanisms, when a mechanism is randomized, that is, outputting a distri-
bution over a set of outcomes, we call a randomized mechanism universally truthful if it takes a
distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
In the mechanism and its analysis presented in the following sections, we will often consider the
optimal solution in a restricted set of elements. Given S ⊆ E, let OPT(S) be the optimal solution
when only elements in S are the input of the problem. For example, the optimal solution of the
problem is denoted by OPT(E). We will simply use OPT to denote the optimal solution of the
problem, i.e., OPT = OPT(E). Let f∗ be the additive function in the XOS definition of v(·) with
f∗(OPT) = v(OPT).
6.2 Key Lemmas
Lemma 6.1. Assume that f∗(e) ≤ 1
α
f∗(OPT) for all e ∈ OPT, then there exists two disjoint sets
S1, S2 ⊂ E such that v(S1) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT) and v(S2) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT).
Proof. We give a constructive proof for this lemma. In the next paragraph, we will show a way to
construct sets S1 and S2 such that f
∗(S1) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT) and f∗(S2) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT). Given that
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v(S1) ≥ f∗(S1) and v(S2) ≥ f∗(S2) implied by the definition of XOS functions, the lemma directly
follows.
Consider an arbitrary order of elements in OPT, we keep adding elements to S1 until that
f∗(S1) ≥ α−12α fOPT (OPT). Then, the rest of agents are included in S2. By the assume that f∗(e) ≤
1
α
f∗(OPT) for all e ∈ OPT, it implies that f∗(S1) ≤ α+12α f∗(OPT). Finally, since f∗(S1)+f∗(S2) =
f∗(OPT), we have f∗(S2) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT).
Next, we show that by partitioning elements uniformly random into two groups, we can have a
good approximation to the optimal solution at both groups in expectation. The proof shares the
same spirit as Lemma 2.1 in [3].
Lemma 6.2. Assume that f∗(e) ≤ 1
α
fOPT (OPT) for all e ∈ OPT. Furthermore, suppose that E
is divided uniformly at random into two groups T1 and T2. Then, with probability of at least
1
2 , it
holds that v(T1) ≥ α−14α f∗(OPT) and v(T2) ≥ α−14α f∗(OPT).
Proof. Let S1, S2 be two disjoint sets such that f
∗(S1) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT) and f∗(S2) ≥ α−12α f∗(OPT).
Consider X1 = S1∩T1, Y1 = S2∩T1,X2 = S1∩T2, Y2 = S2∩T2. As partitioning S1 into X1, Y1 and
partitioning S2 into X2, Y2 are independent to each other. Therefore, with probability
1
2 , the most
valuable parts of S1 and S2 will get into different sets T1 and T2, respectively. Thus the lemma
follows.
6.3 Mechanism
XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN(α, β):
1. W.p. 12 , pick the most value element and pay him b. W.p.
1
2 , continue.
2. Divide elements independently at random with probability 12 into two set T1 and T2.
3. Compute an optimal solution OPT(T1) for elements in T1 given budget b.
4. Set a threshold t = v(OPT(T1))
β·b .
5. Find a set S∗ ⊆ T2 such that
S∗ ∈ argmaxS⊆T2{v(S) − t · c(S)}
where c(S) =
∑
e∈S ce.
6. Let f be the additive function in the XOS definition of v(·) with f(S∗) = v(S∗).
7. Run ADDITIVE-MECHANISM for f with respect to set S∗ and budget b.
8. Output the result of ADDITIVE-MECHANISM.
Lemma 6.3 (Claim 3.1 in [3]). For any S ⊆ S∗, f(S)− t · c(S) ≥ 0.
Lemma 6.4. XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN has a 436-approximation ratio.
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering difference cases. First, assuming that there exists an
element e such that f∗(e) > 1
α
f∗(OPT), XOS-RANDOM-SAMPLE has a probability of 12 to
return the most value agent. Hence, XOS-RANDOM-SAMPLE is 2α-approximate the optimal
in this case.
Second, we consider the case that f∗(e) ≤ 1
α
f∗(OPT) for all e ∈ OPT. The main idea is to
show that there exists a S′ ⊆ S∗ such that c(S′) is at most b and f(S′) is a good approximation to
f∗(OPT). Let us divide this case into two sub-cases.
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– c(S∗) > b. In this case, since c(e) ≤ b for all e ∈ E, we can always find a subset S′ ⊂ S∗ such
that b2 ≤ c(S′) ≤ b. By Lemma 6.3, we know f(S′) ≥ t · c(S′) ≥ v(OPT(T1))β·b · b2 ≥ v(OPT(T1))2β . As
f(OPT(S∗)) is at least f(S′), we have f(OPT(S∗)) ≥ f(S′) ≥ v(OPT(T1))2β ≥ α−18·α·β f∗(OPT) with
a probability of at least 12 .
– c(S∗) ≤ b. Then OPT(S∗) = S∗. Let S′ = OPT \ T1, thus, c(S′) ≤ c(OPT) ≤ b. By Lemma 6.2,
we have v(S′) ≥ α−14α f∗(OPT) with a probability of at least 12 . Since S∗ ∈ argmaxS⊆T2{v(S)−
t · c(S)}, with a probability of at least 12 , we have
f(OPT(S∗)) = f(S∗) = v(S∗)
≥ v(S∗)− t · c(S∗)
≥ v(S′)− t · c(S′)
≥ α− 1
4α
f∗(OPT)− v(OPT(T1))
β · b · b
≥ α− 1
4α
f∗(OPT)− f
∗(OPT)
β
=
α · β − β − 4α
4 · α · β f
∗(OPT)
In both cases, we run ADDITIVE-MECHANISM which has an approximation factor of 3 to
f(OPT(S∗)). Therefore, the approximation ratio for the case that f∗(e) ≤ 1
α
f∗(OPT) for all e ∈
OPT is
1
2
· 1
3
· 1
2
min(
α− 1
8 · α · β ,
α · β − β − 4α
4 · α · β )
To combine with the first case, we conclude that the approximation of the mechanism is
min
( 1
2α
,
1
2
· 1
3
· 1
2
min(
α− 1
8 · α · β ,
α · β − β − 4α
4 · α · β )
)
By setting α ≈ 218 and β ≈ 4.5, we get the approximation of 436.
Lemma 6.5 (Lemma 3.1 in [3]). XOS-MECHANISM-MAIN is universally truthful .
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